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Reform from Within: Positive Solutions for Elected 
Judiciaries 
Chief Justice Wallace Jefferson† 
Since my appointment to fill a vacancy on the Texas Supreme 
Court, I have been a candidate in three judicial elections, each introduc-
ing me to the problematic, often confounding, world of judicial politics.  
In a judicial campaign, the road to victory begins with the solicitation of 
money.  The “ask” is undignified, and the “give” is fairly compelled.  To 
illustrate, consider one common, if not unavoidable, scenario in the cam-
paign of a state court judge:  
Receptionist: I’m sorry, Mr. Jefferson, but Mr. Smith is on the 
phone with a client.  May I take a message? 
Chief Justice Jefferson: Would you let him know that I am Chief 
Justice Jefferson of the Supreme Court of Texas? 
Mr. Smith: Good afternoon, Chief Justice Jefferson.  I am so sorry 
to keep you waiting.  My receptionist didn’t recognize your name. 
Chief Justice Jefferson: No need to apologize, Mr. Smith.  I am call-
ing because I am on the ballot this year, and I could really use your 
help. 
Mr. Smith: Well, I did not intend to get involved in judicial elec-
tions this year, but you are doing a fantastic job as chief justice. 
Chief Justice Jefferson: No one likes the politics in these elections, 
but we are compelled to engage.  Now, you have appeared in my 
court many times.  You would agree, I hope, that I am always pre-
pared for oral argument? 
Mr. Smith: Certainly. 
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Chief Justice Jefferson: Have you noticed an improvement in the 
court’s disposition rate and its expansion of efforts to give legal re-
presentation to the poor? 
Mr. Smith: Yes, Your Honor.  I have been impressed by the court’s 
efficiency and outreach. 
Chief Justice Jefferson: Mr. Smith, may I count on your financial 
support so that I may continue to serve the people of Texas? 
Mr. Smith: Of course, Mr. Chief Justice.  I will take care of that 
right away. 
Chief Justice Jefferson: Thank you, Mr. Smith. 
Realistically, what choice did Mr. Smith have?  Some states attempt 
to mitigate this scenario by prohibiting judges from soliciting campaign 
funds directly or by imposing limits on contributions and expenditures.1  
But judges still know who has contributed, and lawyers are shrewd 
enough to avoid the risk of incurring a judge’s disfavor.  The public 
complains that donating money to judges corrupts the integrity of the 
judicial system.2  Yet in Texas and other states, the public still insists on 
electing its judges.  Recently, one such election attracted the United 
States Supreme Court’s attention, and the resulting decision—that “the 
Constitution require[d] recusal”3—will undoubtedly be debated for years 
to come.4 
I.  PUBLIC PERCEPTION AND RESISTANCE TO JUDICIAL REFORM 
The most formidable obstacle to judicial reform remains the voters 
themselves.  Even states that now enjoy merit selection can attest to the 
battle that inevitably precedes reform.  Take California, for example.  In 
                                                 
 1. See, e.g., Judicial Campaign Fairness Act, TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 253.153-176 (2003). 
 2. See American Judicature Society, History of Reform Effort: Opinion Polls and Surveys, 
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1967, Chief Justice Roger Traynor of the California Supreme Court deli-
vered an address to the Virginia State Bar Association entitled Who Can 
Best Judge the Judges?  Chief Justice Traynor deplored the “circus-like 
aspects of popular election of judges,” and the “scofflaw spirit” that such 
elections bred.5  Praising the movement toward merit-based judicial se-
lection, the chief justice declared that “a glacial force has been gathering 
momentum against the slag of years—the force of nationwide legal edu-
cation now generally recognized as the best in the world.”6  Despite the 
support of the state’s highest judge, as well as that of then-governor Ro-
nald Reagan, it took twelve years for California to adopt a judicial nomi-
nating commission.  Since 1940, thirty-seven states have adopted some 
form of merit selection for their judges.7  Yet, the glacial force described 
by Judge Traynor has slowed its course.  As his vision of inevitable 
progress has waned, public confidence in the rule of law has diminished. 
What is it about judicial elections that so strongly resists the call for 
change?  Instead we might ask: what do our citizens really know about 
the men and women behind the names printed on a judicial ballot?  The 
majority of Americans continue to prefer a system in which they elect 
their judges,8 even though an even greater majority never casts a vote in a 
judicial election, and few can identify a single judicial candidate at the 
voting booth.9  We want our judges to be fair, yet 83% of Texans doubt 
that a judge who has received campaign contributions from a lawyer or 
litigant will remain neutral when deciding the donor’s case.10  These pa-
radoxes should prompt us to examine whether judicial elections actually 
promote accountability. 
The electorate votes for judges by proxy.  In states like Texas, for 
example, where judges run on a partisan ballot, an “R” or a “D” by the 
candidate’s name can trump a lifetime of experience.  Showy commer-
cials attract more votes than a judge’s reputation for careful rulings on 
complex matters of statutory law.  A popular name is golden.  Each of 
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these factors is a poor substitute for merit, yet they all drive judicial elec-
tions.  Campaign contributions convert these inapt proxies into success-
ful campaigns, and we wonder why the public is cynical.  This is not the 
way to ensure accountability.11 
II.  ATTAINING REFORM IN AN IMPERFECT SYSTEM 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has shown how money in judicial 
elections undermines public confidence in our courts and that judicial 
campaigns infused with partisan politics denigrate America’s ideal of 
judicial independence.12  We can eliminate most of that money, and 
much of the bitterness of the campaigns, by adopting a system in which 
the state’s governor appoints a judge from an independent commission’s 
list.  The governor’s appointee would serve for a period of years and then 
stand before the public in an election that tests the incumbent’s perfor-
mance in office.  Politics will inevitably enter the process (as it does in 
all aspects of public life), but a judge’s qualifications, temperament, and 
work ethic would be paramount. 
For those states whose citizenry is wedded to elections, the prospect 
for change is daunting.  Texas came close in 2002, when a proposal for a 
merit and retention system passed the Texas State Senate, but the reform 
stalled in the House of Representatives Judicial Affairs Committee.  For 
elected judges weary of their states’ system of judicial selection, it is 
time to consider how best to salvage the ideals of accountability that in-
itially inspired Americans to demand judicial elections over a century 
ago. 
On the spectrum of political engagement, the elected judge is uni-
quely situated between the appointed judge and the legislator.  No less 
than federal judges, elected judges have a duty to uphold independence 
and impartiality, but like legislators, they are necessarily exposed to the 
partisan politics of the campaign trail.  Unlike federal judges, who are 
rarely seen or heard outside the courtroom, elected judges are driven into 
the community, traveling across the state to make themselves known, 
forging alliances with community leaders, businesses, and interest 
groups.  The elected judge maintains a democratic role, which creates an 
opportunity to build a rapport with the legislature, to advocate for greater 
access to justice, and to promote community education and civic in-
volvement. 
                                                 
 11. See generally, Wallace B. Jefferson, Op-Ed, Why Not Elect Judges on Merit, Not Whim?, 
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 12, 2009, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/ 
dws/dn/opinion/viewpoints/stories/DN-jefferson_13edi.State.Edition1.2212195.html. 
 12. See, e.g., Sandra Day O’Connor, Judicial Accountability Must Safeguard, Not Threaten, 
Judicial Independence: An Introduction, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1 (2008). 
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These elements combine to provide the elected judge with two not-
able assets over her state- or federally-appointed counterpart.  First, the 
elected judge has an indirect voice in the legislature, not only because 
she shares the support of the electorate, but also because her campaign 
will have sought to engage voters in a discussion on improvements to the 
justice system that often require legislative support.  Second, the elected 
judge has a direct link to the community and an incentive to nurture this 
link. 
I am well aware that what I call “assets” are no less riddled with li-
mitations—the risk of political influence, monetary incentives, and un-
seemly campaign tactics, to name a few.  But given that these are the 
realities of today’s elected judiciaries, and until the public is willing to 
embrace a merit-based system, it seems prudent to explore opportunities 
within the existing electoral system.  The following two sections address 
these assets. 
A.  The Role of the Elected Judge in the Legislature 
One of the notable differences between an appointed judge and an 
elected judge is the latter’s role in the legislature.  In the current system 
of judicial elections, state court judges, by necessity, are familiar with the 
engines of policy and the people who drive them.  Armed with this 
knowledge, and bolstered by the electorate, elected judges have the tools 
to advocate for reform.  We have not only the means, but also an obliga-
tion, to advance judicial policy and civic awareness.  In some states, as in 
Texas, a position on the supreme court is one of the few offices elected 
on a statewide ballot.  As such, the legislature has reason to heed the high 
court’s recommendations, as a common electorate voted both the legisla-
tors and the judges into office. 
To be clear, when I speak of having a “voice in the legislature,” I 
do not propose that judges meet with lobbyists, engage in partisan issues, 
or participate in political activities that are frowned upon—rightly so—
by the codes of judicial conduct.  Rather, given the elected judge’s and 
the legislature’s shared attributes, the elected judge may use this connec-
tion to illuminate inadequacies in the justice system.  A primary example 
of the way in which state judges already do this is through annual State 
of the Judiciary Addresses delivered by the chief justice in many states, 
including my own.  The State of the Judiciary Address is an opportunity 
for the high court to highlight pressing judicial issues, while educating 
the public on recent progress made and lingering obstacles that lie ahead.  
It is generally covered in the local press and commands the attention of 
the governor and the state legislature.  Chief justices around the country 
have used the occasion to denounce shortfalls in their court systems and 
630 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:3 
to praise advances secured through the combined efforts of the three 
branches of government.13 
State judges also provide testimony before legislative committees 
and may oversee the work of court-appointed commissions.  In Texas, as 
in many other states, we have created commissions and judicial councils 
that improve upon our state’s system of justice.  In 2001, our court 
founded the Texas Access to Justice Commission to develop and imple-
ment policy initiatives designed to expand access to and enhance the 
quality of justice for low-income Texas residents.  In 2007, Supreme 
Court Justice Harriet O’Neill successfully launched a Permanent Judicial 
Commission for Children, Youth and Families, which now actively 
serves to improve judicial handling of child-protection cases through ad-
vancements in technology, training, and pilot projects. 
The Texas Judicial Council also plays an integral part in the func-
tioning of the court system and its interplay with the legislature.14  
Chaired by the chief justice, the Texas Judicial Council was created by 
the legislature to “consider advice from judges, public officials, members 
of the bar, and citizens concerning remedies for faults in the administra-
tion of justice.”15  This mandate is an appropriate vehicle through which 
judges can affirmatively advocate for reforms that, ultimately, serve the 
public’s interest in a vital judiciary. 
An elected judge’s interaction with the policymaking arm of gov-
ernment, then, can significantly advance legitimate aims of the judiciary.  
Elected judges have the insight and experience to engage politicians, and 
they have the added credibility of having the imprimatur of the voting 
public. 
B.  The Elected Judge’s Link to the Community 
Perhaps the more obvious outcome of judicial elections, and the 
second “asset” of the elected judge, is her accountability to the electo-
rate.  This link between the elected judge and her community is fostered 
through both the judge’s incentive to earn the voters’ support and the 
broad speech protections guaranteed to elected judges since the United 
States Supreme Court decided Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.16  
                                                 
 13. See, e.g., Chief Justice Wallace Jefferson, The State of the Judiciary in Texas (Feb. 11, 
2009), available at http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/pdf/2009StateoftheJudiciary.pdf; Chief 
Justice Jean Hoefer Toal, South Carolina State of the Judiciary (Aug. 20, 2009), available at 
http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/whatsnew/displaywhatsnew.cfm?indexID=570; Chief Justice Leroy 
Rountree Hassell, Sr., 2009 Virginia State of the Judiciary Address (2009), available at 
http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/state_of_the_judiciary_address.html. 
 14. See generally, TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 71 (2005). 
 15. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 71.032 (2005). 
 16. 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
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Unquestionably, White gives judges and judicial candidates greater lati-
tude to speak about issues that may come before them in court.  Like 
many people, I worry that this development may give voice to the view 
that judges improperly engage in policy debates that should remain the 
province of the legislature and other elected officials. Viewed more op-
timistically, however, White permits judges to engage in discussions that 
have entirely apolitical, but salutary purposes—to increase resources to 
the courts, to reform the justice system, and to protect those in our socie-
ty whose access to justice is at risk.  In this sense, White provides elected 
judges with tools to positively engage the community. 
So while I sympathize with those who lament the politicization of 
the courts, I believe that we can also employ White as authority for 
judges to educate the public about the need for judicial reform.  Elected 
judges can meet with businesses, law firms, and legislators to promote 
greater participation in pro-bono lawyering, seek additional technological 
resources that promote efficiency, and bring attention to issues affecting 
access to justice.  Having chosen “to tap the energy and the legitimizing 
power of the democratic process,”17  elected judges can utilize the First 
Amendment protections White offers as a means to educate, rather than 
as a means to politick. 
The debate over White epitomized the elected judge’s struggle to 
maintain both independence and accountability—competing norms that 
have dominated the discussion over elected judiciaries.  On the one hand, 
voters are entitled to know the judicial candidates’ credentials and be-
liefs.  On the other hand, interest groups will try to lure the judge into 
political debates that could undermine his neutrality on matters that will 
ultimately land in court.  The judge who is sensitive to the judiciary’s 
role in our system of government will not be drawn into these partisan 
debates.  Instead, she will use her status for a greater purpose—“the effi-
cient administration of justice”—through the pulpit she is given on the 
electoral stage. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The battle to dispense with an elected judiciary is a worthwhile en-
deavor.  Judicial elections force judges to raise money from lawyers and 
litigants; they give voters the false impression that party affiliation or 
persuasive television commercials are an adequate substitute for merit; 
they undermine the Founders’ concept that judges rule not according to 
popular will, but to advance the rule of law.  Yet as we continue to urge 
states to appoint judges by merit, we should salvage from the current sys-
                                                 
 17. Id. at 788 (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991)). 
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tem those attributes that have the potential to improve the administration 
of justice.  The elected judge may legitimately exploit her connection to 
the voters to press for enhanced judicial resources, to reduce the cost of 
litigation through technological innovations, to enhance access to justice 
through legislative remedies, and even to promote merit selection as an 
alternative to partisan judicial elections.  Political skills honed in a cam-
paign can thus be used to improve the lives of those engaged in litigation 
and to promote a judiciary that serves not only litigants, but society at 
large. 
 
